Notes on Methodology, Experiments & Protocol

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  • Auburn
    Keymaster
    • Type: TiNe
    • Development: l--l
    • Attitude: Adaptive

    Hello. I write this here as a potential mitigation of practitioner error, and as a fail-safe to this system which I so value. Right now CT is far too highly dependent on me and my opinion. As with anything that is aiming to eventually grow into a science, this is far from ideal and dependency on any one person should be removed as soon as possible. I write this article to remind me of the values CT has in place (and for others here to be able to hold me accountable) until such a time comes that new vultologists and a new consensus can prevent chronic paradigmatic myopia. I’ve seen over time how susceptible we are to our unconscious biases, how we have a limited capacity to know and have a drive/impulse to want certainty where there is none.

    Subjective-Objective Matching

    Something which I wrote in the book:

    I must begin by reiterating that type is a vastly more complex matter than what these first principles of visual reading could account for by themselves. One would be at high risk of err by exclusively using an objective avenue of measure (such as vultology offers) to determine the properties of a subjective matter: the psyche of an individual. Psychological avenues of analysis must be used in conjunction with this methodology for the achievement of a refined understanding of the psyche which it is attempting to identify. And there is no other substitute for accurate psychological insights than what time and firsthand experience can birth. In this light, vultology presents but a small and partial window into the happenings of the psyche, yet I find it so deeply fortunate that we should receive even such a window into our humanity. We must never forget, however, that the information elicited by the psyche always holds priority over the signals presented by the body. Should there be a contradiction between the psychology anticipated by visual signals and the actual psychology of the person, the signals must be given less authority. Never must the nature of the actual person be ignored for the preservation of a signal’s consistency. Vultology seeks to approximate the psyche based on reading the secondary effects that emerge from the psyche itself. As such, vultology can only ever be a useful tool if it can properly manage to predict psychology; it cannot define it.

    I thought long and hard about this when I wrote it, and realized what a mess it would cause. In doing so, CT makes things exponentially harder for itself. Because negotiating with subjective experience is incredibly hard. It would be much easier to tell people their type and have them have no say on the matter. But then we would never come closer to a real truth, and would be running away from the hard problem of consciousness. So CT splits the authority equally in two places, which don’t have the luxury of disagreeing.

    CT is structured in such a way that it dares to speak about people’s inner experiences through their objective expressions. And in so doing it’s trying to bridge the gap between mind and matter, between psyche and physicality. And it’s a highly delicate endeavor that requires every ounce of interpersonal patience — to learn about a person earnestly, and truly listen to their experience — as well as the most acute perception of their physical expressions.

    So how are we to approach this? How can we make headway into the question of psychology from vultology, in a manner that is dependable?

    Ideal Protocol

    This has not been the protocol to date but officially speaking, the only thing CT ought to be able to say to a person follows a deductive path something like this:

    • 1) You appear to display [ this ] cluster of visual signals
    • 2) We have [ x number of ] samples who fit this precise constellation of signals, and what they share in common is:
      • [ this quality ] at [ this ] percentage, which is above the average
      • [ this quality ] at [ this ] percentage, which is above the average
      • [ this quality ] at [ this ] percentage, which is above the average
    • 3) We anticipate that you would share the same attributes in common, according to the hypothesis that a direct link exists between mind and expression.

    The problem is we don’t yet have percentages, as we’re not even at this stage yet. But for example if an Fe-lead comes along saying “I’m not a socialist” the right answer that CT should give is “that’s fine, but according to our stats, vultological Fe-leads are 40% more likely to be socialist in philosophy than the baseline.” This would be based on (lets say) 100 Fe-lead samples and by measuring their political preferences.

    This both makes a statistical claim that can be supported, while not imposing that quality onto the subject. In this way, it preserves both the subject’s capacity to deviate from the profile, while retaining the validity of the profile as a set of high-percentage statistics. Their lack of socialist philosophy would also, for example, reduce the 40% to 38%. If ten more Fe-leads come along and say they’re not socialist either, then the percent may drop to 20% above the norm. If it gets low enough the trait would be seen as “statistically insignificant” and be removed from the profile.

    Optimal Scenario

    And even if vultology is working properly, there would never be any quality/trait with 100% statistical fidelity. But the phenomenon of CT would be validated if for example statistics clustered in all the expected places, in harmony across all the types like so:

    So in this way, we could see clusters of traits (if they do exist) represented across quadras, function axes, etc. This would let us know if the vultology signals are actually grouping people together with “significant” differences, from an objective angle of measure.

    A study of this sort is definitely doable, and CT allows for this level of checking, but it would take lots of preparation and funding to get there. The statistics would have to be done by:

    • Using a blind selection of samples (non-celebrities) from the general population.
    • Typing them by several different vultologists in different rooms / etc.
    • Then giving each sample a long survey (I’d go for ~100 questions) related to anything from their political preferences, occupations, ideal occupations, hobbies, habits, etc.
    • Then seeing if:
      • 1. The vultologists agreed on the readings.
      • 2. The readings agreed with the surveys in a statistically significant manner.

    If the results turn out positive, then CT would be in a position to make a compelling case to other groups who could peer review it across other countries and see if the methodology is repeatable. If it turns out to be repeatable, and indeed scales up in other countries, then it will have been established as a breakthrough in psychology that (I hope) proves more significant in predicting personality than the Big Five.

    I find it important to at least make mention of “how” CT hopes to get to where it’s going, so that a target remains in sight. But before a study like this can even make it on the desk of an academic body, the CTVC has to be standardized to the point where each term is firmly defined down to the letter, and we have to have a group of vultologists that have a high level of consensus.

    Why? (& current protocol)

    Now, why go through the trouble?

    The answer to that is that, even now using a very imperfect methodology, signs of the patterns appear to be clustering in precisely the way they would in a natural phenomenon. There’s a lot of “headcanon” here, but a cursory glance reveals that not only do signals coincide with psychological dispositions, but this holds true across quadras in precisely the way we’d expect for them to compound.

    So for example, the qualities we find in Betas (Fe/Ti+Ni/Se) and Deltas (Te/Fi+Ne/Si) which are opposite quadras via their signals, are intermixed in precisely the ways we’d expect them to be in Alphas and Gammas. This lets us know that the “Fe/Ti” signals transcend quadras in an independent manner, and compound with Ni/Se or Ne/Si independently. Likewise for Gammas.

    Now, if this can also be shown to be the case in the statistical analysis, then the existence of the axes can be established. So taking a look at this chart again with some modifications:

    ^ Lets assume each bar is a question on the survey, and the length of the bar represents the level of agreement there was between the ~50 people sampled of each type. We can test to see if the new samples agree with the expected outcomes, and if a pattern emerges.

    Current Protocol

    Right now the protocol is very much like the above in its concept, but far looser and more informal in every domain.

    Profiles:

    The profiles are indeed written from the samples, but not by taking surveys of their preferences. Instead for example, the Fe profile is written by googling all the Fe users and taking note of their careers, books, etc. From there, careers, hobbies, books, lifestyles commonalities etc are identified and written into a profile of “what this visual cluster of people are like.”

    Readings:

    The readings are done using the CTVC version 1.4, which does not yet have all the signals defined with precise GIF examples, although in general they’ve been described in the book.

    Psychological Comparisons:

    Test beds. So far we’ve used the Discord chat, and most recently this forum, to check for fidelity between visually confirmed samples and their psychologies. This again requires the principle at the start of this post. But the downside to this approach is that some qualities appear as grey areas. If for example, we wanna remove quality [ x ] from the [ x ] profile, we have to rely on statistical guesstimation.

    This leads to effects such as some members not resonating with certain qualities, and no frame of reference through which to know how typical or atypical such a disagreement is. Solving this problem, using the above method, would allow us to solve the “I relate” / “I don’t relate” issue without invalidating a person’s experience.

    A type can then come to say “I don’t relate to point number 5, but I relate to 14/15 of the survey questions” — in which case they would be self-convinced that the profile overall is accurate, even if some details are off. Or, conversely, if they don’t relate to 10 of the 15 qualities, then we have a fair and just method by which to say “wow! you broke our system!” and we can go back to the drawing board and do better. This preserves both ethical and logical integrity.

    How to Get There:

    To Do List:

    • Finish the CTVC listing, filled with GIFs and precise descriptions of each signal
    • Finish converting the database to the Development Levels
    • Get the database up to 2,000 samples

    And then… (or during)

    • Gather a group of 10 vultologists with 95%+ consensus
    • Secure funds for a formal study of ~1000+ random people in the general population
    • Run the experiment
      • If successful: Write profiles based on the statistical findings
      • If unsuccessful: Revise the vultology code, core assumptions, etc

    Thanks to the launch of the new website, and the reopening of readings, I’m now able to make a livable income through CT. This means that I can dedicate all my free time (aside from readings) to this endeavor. But in the meantime there will be errors made & areas of improvement identified. I’m hoping you can all be patient with me as I try to bring this all to a head, and learn more about you guys in preparation for this study.

    And if I fall into the snare of asserting realities about someone that go against their personal experience, remind me that I have no right to talk until I provide my proof. I’ve seen far too many typology “experts” fall into solipsistic caverns, and I’m actually terrified of the same happening to CT. So please continue to challenge me, and hold me to the project’s vision.

    And if you have any ideas on how to go about the experimentation process, feel free to share!

    • This topic was modified 1 year, 5 months ago by Auburn.
    • This topic was modified 1 year, 5 months ago by Auburn.
    • This topic was modified 1 year, 5 months ago by Auburn.
    • This topic was modified 1 year, 5 months ago by Auburn.
    Animal
    Participant
    • Type: SeFi
    • Development: lll-
    • Attitude: Unseelie

    I write this here as a potential mitigation of practitioner error, and as a fail-safe to this system which I so value. Right now CT is far too highly dependent on me and my opinion. And as anything that is aiming to eventually grow into a science, this is far from ideal and so I write this article to remind myself of the values CT has baked in place (and for others here to be able to hold me accountable) until such a time comes that new vultologists and a new consensus can prevent chronic paradigmatic myopia. I’m far too aware of human frailty and our limited capacity to know, but also of our (my) impulse to want certainty where there is none.

    This is why you’re the ideal person for the job 🙂

    You and I have disagreed more than once 🙂 to put it lightly.  Our recent argument regarding Se and Fe, for example, may be an ongoing debate among us and other members.

    However, any time I think “screw it, I’m either not articulating properly or he just doesn’t get it” – then you surprise me with some post that shows you were really listening to the dissent, considering different angles, and comprehending new material that seemed we would hopelessly disagree on only moments before.

    Next thing I know, you’ve opened my eyes to new ways of viewing things. I thought I was right, but then you show me the light 😀 just as you see the light in what others are saying.

    You continue to surprise me. I really shouldn’t be surprised anymore, because your pattern has shown itself — the pattern being: You care.  The system is bigger than you, and you honor it. You also honor other people, even when they are wrong or only half-right 🙂 but in the end your dedication to the system is uncompromising, and you’ll draw the line, respectfully – between appeasing people and actually doing what’s right for the system.

    The key is that you realize you may not always know what’s right for the system. You allow it to channel itself through you, and in doing so, you do your best to confront your own biases in the process. It would be impossible to do this perfectly and wholly, since you’re human. But every day you do better than you did yesterday, and that’s what counts.

    It is exciting to think it will continue to expand. I just hope you can find people for the team who are as dedicated as yourself, so things don’t get diluted.  After so many arguments, my respect for your process continues to grow.  It is downright inspiring to witness, and I only hope to approach my own work with that level of integrity. 🙂

    • This reply was modified 1 year, 5 months ago by Animal.
    • This reply was modified 1 year, 5 months ago by Animal.
    • This reply was modified 1 year, 5 months ago by Animal.
    • This reply was modified 1 year, 5 months ago by Animal.
    sekundaer
    Participant
    • Type: TiNe
    • Development: l-l-
    • Attitude: Adaptive

     

    It was with great satisfaction I read about these scientific considerations.
    I have been planning to write something of that sort, but its difficult since I dont know enough, but all that you wrote here was just down the alley where I would like to take a walk.
    The new website has a danger to it, as only members that are typed can make posts.  This could easily become a little closed group where members  agree with one another, and since it takes a long time before someone new to CT can come up with qualified critic (at that time that person has probably accepted most of CT),  CT is ‘susceptible to circularity’ to use a term from the OP.
    While still trying to metabolize the basics, I have seen new advancements lately, speculations about new formulations of Fe and its mythology, specifications of the meanings of every development level.  Its all extremely creative, in CT language its highly developed N and there is an elegance to all of it –  and I  wonder (but hope) it can survive a deeper scrutiny based on empirical investigation.  But just think of Freud’s theories that was taken for granted during a whole century.  So much that the denial of the Oedipus complex was seen as a verification of it (since it showed the strength of the suppression).  The explanations that was possible to build upon it was so appealing and this fascination kept it alive for so long although much of it was without validity.

    The beauty of CT is (for me) the definitions/descriptions of the functions. The *connections* between the functions are very appealing, but I find reasons to he skeptic, still I have already got used to make the combination Te/Fi, Se/Ni etc. and I find myself sometimes  taking it for granted although I cannot find the reasons to do so.  The same goes with the “type dynamics”.  I often find that if someone seems Je to me, he also seems Pe (the same with Ji and Pi).  I read the article by Reynierse mentioned in an earlier post that concluded: “Type dynamics, in any form, simply does not organize the data in an orderly fashion that corresponds with the facts. Type dynamics is a conceptually muddled construct that lacks coherence”.  I found it (of course) interesting that there actually IS some coherence in Jungs original idea, that goes like this E>E > I>I  (i.e. the auxiliary function is in the same attitude as the dominant function)   I know that the study was based on MBTi functions, but still…
    If that should be the case for CT functions too, CT would still have its precise descriptions of functions and the vultology signals.  Just this in itself is a major contribution.  I would like such a CT-light version. Then I could let go of all my skepticism.

    But how about a tiny, not study, but experiment, where the thesis of the function pairs/tandems were tested.  I dont know how that could be done, but maybe the hypothesis could be something like:  If  functions can be decided with the help of vultology and if Te always goes with Fi, and Fe with Ti, then if one group examined clips with 20 unknown people and select those with Te signals and another group select those with Fi signals, then the same persons should be chosen to a large extend by both of the groups.
    This setup is not good enough, as there is an overlap of Te and Fi signals,  Fi signals are included in the Te signals, but maybe there is some way around this.  Also everybody who are able to make that assessment would get the overall idea of the persons type and therefore be prone to make choices in accordance with the theoretical system.  But maybe another kind of  simple experiment could be thought of. I cannot come up with a better idea right now.

     

     

     

    • This reply was modified 1 year, 5 months ago by sekundaer.
    sekundaer
    Participant
    • Type: TiNe
    • Development: l-l-
    • Attitude: Adaptive

    What I asked for when I wrote the above post have been delivered in a post with the topic ” Vultology Report Explained” and I have made my comment there.

    Supah Protist
    Participant
    • Type: SeTi
    • Development: ll-l
    • Attitude: Directive

    So how important should behavior be in determining someone’s type? This is the point I was getting at with the video I made awhile back. Let’s say that DJ Khaled and Neil deGrasse Tyson have the same vultology. How then are their behavioral differences to be accounted for. If cognitive typology is to have any predictive power, shouldn’t identical types share a high level of behavioral traits? No two people are the exact same, but the whole idea behind cognitive typology is that behavior is significantly correlated with vultology. I didn’t have any quantitative measure of the behavioral differences between the two celebrities I mentioned, I referenced my own qualitative observations, however, the vultology code is also qualitative at its core. There’s no numerical threshold that constitutes the “Rigid Posture” signal being present, the code only become quantitative  when Instances of signals begin to be counted, and even those aren’t explicitly factored to a subject’s typing. What I’m saying is that I didn’t have a framework by which to offer a good argument for why these two subjects exhibited different behavioral profiles. In the case of celebrities, we can’t administer surveys.  In this case, how can we validate whether or not two celebrities’ behavioral profiles match their vultologies? DJ Khaled and Neil deGrasse Tyson present very differently from a behavioral point of view, but the cognitive typology theory has no means by which to represent their behavioral profile and thus no way to compare behavior to vultology.

    Auburn
    Keymaster
    • Type: TiNe
    • Development: l--l
    • Attitude: Adaptive

    What I’m saying is that I didn’t have a framework by which to offer a good argument for why these two subjects exhibited different behavioral profiles. In the case of celebrities, we can’t administer surveys. In this case, how can we validate whether or not two celebrities’ behavioral profiles match their vultologies? DJ Khaled and Neil deGrasse Tyson present very differently from a behavioral point of view, but the cognitive typology theory has no means by which to represent their behavioral profile and thus no way to compare behavior to vultology.


    @supahprotist
    – Putting aside the issue of not being able to administer surveys to celebrities, and assuming that we are only dealing with people who we can administer surveys to — I think this problem is resolvable. But the survey has to be structured at a level that is not so behaviorally shallow, but which is rooted in cognition.

    So for example, for a survey section, rather than asking “do you like rap, money and singing” or “do you like science and  technology”, we can ask meaningful metabolic questions that go beyond the superficiality of specific topics. If two types are twin shades, then they should be applying themselves similarly even if their domain of interest is radically different — as radically different as rap and science, for instance.

    So presumably, if DJ Khaled and Neil Tyson were the same type (this can be contested)– they’d answer the survey similarly in the cognitive-esque ways that matter (or a more sophisticated behaviorism). For instance, they might score high on desiring to mentor the next generation (Fe) in whatever the topic at hand is, valuing the preservation of their group (Fe) and communal structure, echoing out a meaningful message to the world (Fe) with strong impact, while also having liberty and fun in the process (Se), staying ever curious (Pe), continuing to try new things always (Pe), take risks, and master their crafts with a combination of diligence (Je) and spontaneous creativity (Pe).

    ^ These are just examples off the top of my head, but I hope it gets the point across?

    The metabolism we’d be trying to measure here is Je l-l- cognition, and Beta cognition, in the abstract. If we can design surveys that can capture that, I think this is far more useful. This would put the burden on CT to provide the survey, as a testing device– one that can bypass any superficial topic-contingency and still connect people together based on a common cognitive-to-behavioral root.

    I wonder if this addresses your question though? Let me know.

    • This reply was modified 1 month, 1 week ago by Auburn.
    • This reply was modified 1 month, 1 week ago by Auburn.
    • This reply was modified 1 month, 1 week ago by Auburn.
    • This reply was modified 1 month, 1 week ago by Auburn.
    • This reply was modified 1 month, 1 week ago by Auburn.
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    Supah Protist
    Participant
    • Type: SeTi
    • Development: ll-l
    • Attitude: Directive

    @auburn is cognitive type not intended to model domain of interest? I think this is question of scope. I’m not clear on what aspects of psychology cognitive type is attempting to model. Cognition is not a well defined term in my opinion. Neuroscience studies the nervous system, a structure that is easily identifiable in organisms that have one. Cognitive science purports to study “the mind and its processes” except no one knows what a mind really is. At least from my perspective, I would expect any “model of the mind” or “cognitive architecture” to attempt to account for all mental phenomena, including interest at some level of granularity. Perhaps you use the word cognition to encompass a smaller scope of phenomena than I would expect. Can you have a complete picture of the mind without including interests? It may be the case that cognitive type is attempting to model a set of subsystems of the mind, but not the mind itself. I know that cognitive type isn’t trying to model everything the nervous system does; respiration and digestion for example, but I don’t have a good sense of the ground the theory is trying to cover. This also may come down to the following question. What is a cognitive function? Are one’s cognitive functions responsible for everything a one does? If not, then what are they responsible for? Are they specific to humans or do all organisms have cognitive functions. A bacterium can certainly detect its environment, move through its environment and exhibit goal directed behavior and some would certainly argue that those activities qualify as cognition.

    https://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/~karl/The%20free-energy%20principle%20A%20unified%20brain%20theory.pdf

    This is a link to an article on the “Free Energy Principle”; a theory of self organizing systems. It describes a cycle consisting of perception, action, external states and internal states which may correspond to revising, conducting, decompressing and compressing respectively. I share this to illustrate my own potential presuppositions about cognition. Is your use of the word cognition meant to encapsulate the behavior of goal directed systems in general, a subset of human neural activity or perhaps something else?

    Auburn
    Keymaster
    • Type: TiNe
    • Development: l--l
    • Attitude: Adaptive

    (I haven’t had time to read the full article you posted– only to glance through it — but I hope I can answer your question nonetheless)

    The question of topic-of-interest is one which, in my opinion, is highly contingent on external factors — such as availability, exposure, social pressure, etc. It’s not without correlation, but this correlation to type needs to be approached properly.

    A person may go into music if that is the avenue adjacent to them when growing up, and then they will direct their cognition towards the task. If we are defining type as an essential pattern of cognitive processing, then this would be the same regardless of where the person is located, whether in career or hobby. Because of this fact, one would need to look at differences within those of the same demographic or interest, to discern typological differences through the manner in which the person approaches the subject –and not just based on the subject itself.

    For example, we can look at differences between FeNi musicians and SiTe musicians, and we may find contrasts in their styles, approaches and philosophies on the topic at hand. But the topic (“music”) is not itself an identifier of one type. Similarly, “science” as a topic, cannot be definitively linked to any one type or groups of types — even though we may see statistical leanings in some types towards science. If we say that Deltas are 20% more inclined to specialize in sciences than other quadrants, that still would mean that a great deal of other quadrants will have scientists as well, and science as a field is essentially unreliable as an indicator for type, or as an argument against a certain typing. Given this, I would propose a method like the following to discern a case like DJ Khaled vs Neil DeGrasse Tyson:

    We compare each person to other musicians and scientists respectively. So for example, compared to other musicians/singers, where does Dj Khaled fall? And compared to other scientists, where does Neil DeGrasse Tyson fall?

    I would argue that, in their respective domains, both are doing very much the same thing. Tyson is viewed, by the scientific community, moreso as a spokesperson and science communicator, rather than a serious scholar. He’s a bit of a proselytizer for science and acts as an empathic voice for the population to get involved in something he sees as spiritually meaningful. He runs a show called “Star Talk”, and is a media personality. Overall, Tyson is a media personality more than he is a scholar. Therefore, as far as scientists goes he’s an outlier, and his personality clearly shows itself in relation to others in his field.

    Now if we turn to DJ Khaled, we see a similar pattern. Many singers are just singers, but DJ Khaled is also a former radio host. He rose to fame by being a radio host (i.e. media personality) and when in fame he became a record executive and producer. He has executive abilities and is focused on leadership. Neil Tyson, too, is a producer of a sort — having many of his own television series, in which he features prominently and has a strong artistic hand in. So in both subjects we see a strong focus on social presence, media influence, maintaining a certain image/persona — which transcend both of their specific domains.

    At least from my perspective, I would expect any “model of the mind” or “cognitive architecture” to attempt to account for all mental phenomena, including interest at some level of granularity.

    I agree, but it’s “at some level of granularity.”

    That level is necessarily at the tail end of the causal chain. If a model of the mind is to be built, then the specific role that topics or domains play, in this holistic picture, must be at the tail end of the process. If it is not, then we are assuming that a baby is born with a sort of deterministic disposition to gravitate towards a given domain, at highly invariant degrees.

    I’m sure you’d agree this is simply silly. If a child is born into an environment where they cannot be a painter, they won’t be a painter. But their nature doesn’t change. A child’s nature (cognition) must be topic-less, coming before content, and content becomes the mere vessel through which the child or adult expresses their cognition.

    Therefore topics of interest will always have secondary/tertiary priority in determining cognition, and they are moreso interesting statistical aggregates which — while not to be ignored — cannot be “prescriptive” of type, only descriptive of it in loose fashion.

    Perhaps you use the word cognition to encompass a smaller scope of phenomena than I would expect. Can you have a complete picture of the mind without including interests?

    Certainly, we need to include interests, as I mentioned above, chiefly as a means to understand the higher cognitive truth of the person — not specifically by the interest, but in how the interest is approached. But interests themselves, in static form, cannot be used to identify type. We can say most musicians are reviser types (which is true), but being a musician does not make someone a reviser type.

    Thus, the role that interests play in the equation is informational, but not diagnostic. They can be clues to a likely root cognitive reality, but they are not definitive indicators of anything.

    • This reply was modified 1 month, 1 week ago by Auburn.
    • This reply was modified 1 month, 1 week ago by Auburn.
    Auburn
    Keymaster
    • Type: TiNe
    • Development: l--l
    • Attitude: Adaptive

    What is a cognitive function? Are one’s cognitive functions responsible for everything a one does? If not, then what are they responsible for?

    Not everything. The cognitive architecture in question (and which I’m hoping to better outline in the near future) is concerned with two complementary tasks: information-synthesis and framework-formation. In other words, registering/understanding what things are, and what can be done with them. This is indeed not the entire focus of the brain, and it refers to a certain sub-set of brain processes.

    But I also believe this sub-set is in some ways a discrete entity — an apparatus that is designed to metabolize information into consciousness. These four processes (explorer, compass, worldview, articulator) are a set of operations which exist tightly knit together, the same way some organs of the body are sub-systems within the larger whole.

    What is a cognitive function?

    This is a very simple yet very complex question, and I can only give my speculation. Firstly, I think everything the brain does is emergent from the laws within the neuron. The neuron has rules within it, which leads to self-organization to occur across large neuronal matrices, which creates an emergent ‘organ’ of processing. We can think of this a little bit like how beehives are formed by the emergent activity of the rules within each bee.

    A cognitive function, I suspect, is therefore the net result of a specific rule within a neuron, that magnifies across millions of neurons, to create laws of metabolic processing which travel across neural sets to create outputs. I don’t yet entirely understand the mechanism, but I’m very interested in the work of people like Mark Harnett (http://www.markharnett.org/) who is trying to map out these “rules” that emerge from a single neuron.

    As far as I understand, the neuron uses epigenetic markers to turn on/off parts of it’s cell’s code, based on what inputs it recieves over time. Effectively, a neuron — or a whole set of neurons — can be compelled to alter their epigenetic markers so that they effectively operate/compute differently than other neurons in the brain, which leads to different computational outcomes from different neuronal ‘groups’ or ‘loops’ in the brain. We might call the rule within each neuron the cognitive function, or the aggregate of all neurons displaying that epigenetic alteration and the consequential processing pathway they perform together.

    That’s as close to a guess as I can give at the moment, and I’m quite obviously way out of my league here. I’m aiming to study more about neuronal computations.

    Are they specific to humans or do all organisms have cognitive functions.

    All organisms have cognitive functions. But humans have a particular set which no other organism has. If we think of these as the ‘rules’ within a neuron, then no other animal has the same ‘rules’ within their neurons that we do — so that their neuronal sets never organize into computational highways the ways ours do.

    In this sense, the difference between human brains and animal brains is not just a difference in size but of kind. Some case studies have shown people with large parts of their brain missing, effectively making their brain mass smaller than some animals, by body ratio. Yet they can still think, talk and do human things, because the little brain matter they have is still organized differently, in how it makes connections between neurons and how it computes information with the same neural real-estate as other animals.

    You can use a 500GB computer to run a library of games, or as a web server. Different organisms have different cognitive processes, specific to their evolutionary history and their needs.

    (However, I don’t see why the cognitive typology architecture couldn’t exist, in a more rudimentary form, in other lower mammals too. But I don’t think it would be formatted in such a way as to create the layers of abstraction that are possible for us.)

    • This reply was modified 1 month, 1 week ago by Auburn.
    • This reply was modified 1 month, 1 week ago by Auburn.
    Supah Protist
    Participant
    • Type: SeTi
    • Development: ll-l
    • Attitude: Directive

    @auburn, I don’t see how what I understand as an interest can be primarily environmental. By interest, I’m referring to innate predispositions as opposed to contextual availabilities. For example, people get hungry regardless of whether or not there is food present. I don’t think environment proximity accounts for people’s choice of vocational pursuit. I think it (nurture) is a factor that when combined with one’s nature, determines one’s behavior.

    I also don’t think that all types of cognition are universally applicable. I don’t think you can produce music with any set of function oscillations. By function oscillations I’m referring to NeTi, SiFi, TeFi etc. and not Quadra. If you put someone in a context where they don’t have any innate capacity, they will not thrive. I have knowledge of this from first hand experience. Here’s another way to put it. I don’t think you can actually do science with just the SeFe oscillation. I know there’s more to these people’s types than their conscious functions, but this is an example. By “do science” I’m referring to the actual neurophysiological process of writing papers and grant proposals, designing and running experiments and all of the other tasks that make up a career as a scientist. My argument is that such a collection of activities involve a distinct subset of cognitive processes that some people have an innate disposition for. I would say that a career in science or music is indicative (but not determinative) of type by virtue of science and music being distinct activities at the cognitive/neurophysiological level. Cognition is still physiology. If cognition is visible in someone’s gesticulations and facial expressions, why would it stop at that level of physiology? Behavior is also physiological. Embodied cognition isn’t only present in conversational settings. Cognition is also what people do, not just how they think.

    I’m not arguing that career plays a deterministic role in type, but rather that one’s career combined with one’s fit with that career can be indicative of type. If your innate aptitudes match up with your context, you’re in good shape, if not, then you’re worse off. This isn’t a discrete scheme either, there are degrees of fit.

    The DJ Khaled Neil deGrasse Tyson comparison could be made as follows. If their contexts were switched at birth, would they have turned out the same? I don’t think DJ Khaled chose music production solely because it was available to him and I don’t think Neil deGrasse Tyson chose science simply because it was available. In my opinion, what each of these individuals actually do day to day (science communication and music production) do not involve the same cognitive functions. What each of these people have chosen to pour thousands of hours into are not analogous activities. I don’t think shared executive capacity is a sufficient trait to justify these two individuals being typed identically. I don’t think how these people do what they do transcends what they actually do.

    I think I see interest as much more fundamental than you do and I think I am justified in doing so. In my opinion, interest is not primarily environmental. What somebody is exposed to is the stimulus and the interest is the response.

    I’m not quite sure what you’re saying about cognitive functions being the result of the rules of a single neuron. Are you saying that a cognitive function is the product of the rules of an individual neuron in the brain?

    I would agree that there are species specific cognitive architectures, but this is all evolutionary. Humans share a cognitive architecture due to a shared common ancestor, but this argument follows for ever group of organisms we share a common ancestor with. Human brains are animal brains. I don’t think there are any radical physiological differences between our brains and the brains of our close evolutionary relatives.

    Auburn
    Keymaster
    • Type: TiNe
    • Development: l--l
    • Attitude: Adaptive

    My argument is that such a collection of activities involve a distinct subset of cognitive processes that some people have an innate disposition for. I would say that a career in science or music is indicative (but not determinative) of type by virtue of science and music being distinct activities at the cognitive/neurophysiological level. Cognition is still physiology.

    Hmm, okay, I think I’m more or less following along with your deductive path– or so I hope. I’ll try to respond to what I think you’re saying. From a neurological perspective, a person who has spent the last 5 years pouring thousands of hours into music, and a person who’s spent the past 5 years pouring thousands of hours into physics/math — would have different brains. I can agree with that. (Though neuroplasticity makes this a bit of a chicken-and-egg problem, as to whether the brain was primed for it first, or if it grew to meet the task. But putting that aside…)

    If Khaled and Tyson were placed under an EEG their domain specializations ought to come through in more activity in the respective brain regions. But a typology based on this sort of physiological actuality would steer itself away from cognitive/jungian typology — which is fine, but we begin to talk about something else.

    For example, the multiple intelligences theory. I would imagine that if a person wished to be brain-mapped, and then compared to a database of other brain-mapped people, “type” could be considered a match in brain mapping beyond a certain percentile of similarity, by whatever level of granularity one wished to use. How many types this would make, I’m not sure. I don’t think the multiple intelligences model is the end-all either, and the human connectome project has proposed over a hundred different brain processes, for instance. Type, at this physiological level, starts to become problematic.

    Furthermore, this also leaves the question of neuroplasticity open. Suppose a pair of twins had a strict father. The father wanted one twin to be a mozart prodigy, and the other to be a math prodigy. Both children just wanted to be good children and their personal interests became irrelevant in their upbringing. However, they came to like what they did over time. At age 18, after seven years of training, each one’s brain is tested via EEG. What would we see? Would the twins, who (lets say) had nearly the same neural activity at age 11, still have the same activity now? Would they have diverged, due to neuroplasticity? And does this mean they’ve changed type? Would neuroplasticity allow for type to change, if we define type as physiological brain specialization? Or perhaps fluid types is not theoretically problematic in this case?

    ~~~

    But going back on topic… the models related to Jung are trying to map a very specific set of processes that handle the construction of mental objects from raw information inputs, and the execution of commands in accordance to a logistical comprehension of object-causalities, presently, and across time. Therefore, this sort of typology (which CT is allied to) does not deal with — or model — other brain specializations such as musical, kinesthetic/cerebellum, mathematical, spatial, etc. The cognitive architecture in question deals with object recognition/formation from inputs, and object causalities or outputs.

    The theory of cognitive typology is only stating that, in this specific way (i.e. the architecture above described), humans differ by how they are weighted/biased in the direction of information-gathering(Pe), definitional processing (Ji), procedural processing (Je) or temporal contextualizing (Pi).

    Additional variations, layered atop of these, require an intersectional approach which can compound cognitive type with other features. So for example, one might be FeNi + musical/kinesthetic and another might be FeNi + mathematic/spatial, or some other combination. That is how CT would resolve differences of that sort. So, CT is not claiming to be the entire encompassing reality of the human brain– it is calling out emergent and measurable variations of a specific kind, in a specific field. If the things/categories one is seeking to differentiate out, between people, relate to some other mental capacities, then another paradigm may need to be used and/or appended.

    • This reply was modified 1 month, 1 week ago by Auburn.
    • This reply was modified 1 month, 1 week ago by Auburn.
    • This reply was modified 1 month, 1 week ago by Auburn.
    • This reply was modified 1 month, 1 week ago by Auburn.
    • This reply was modified 1 month, 1 week ago by Auburn.
    • This reply was modified 1 month, 1 week ago by Auburn.
    • This reply was modified 1 month ago by Auburn.
    Supah Protist
    Participant
    • Type: SeTi
    • Development: ll-l
    • Attitude: Directive

    I guess we see the jungian cognitive architecture differently. Or perhaps, more accurately, we have different hopes as to what it is a theory of. The type of theory I’m after is essentially one of universal biological processes (like the Free Energy Principle) whereas you seem to be aiming at a more local theory. I do think Neojungian theories may be fundamentally biological rather than only psychological in nature. Bacteria definitely gather information, act as if they know what different things are in their environment and act on their environment (I couldn’t think of a bacterial Pi analog, but there may be one). Anyway, it seems I’m looking for a fundamental theory of life while you seem to be looking for something more focused in scope.

    Also, as far as the chicken-egg question goes, I was definitely positing that the brain would be primed first. You definitely can’t force people into any specialization. Nurture can’t completely override nature and vice versa.

    Additionally, if type is an empirical phenomenon it would have to be able to measured via some method of brain imaging, so if nurture overrides nature in the brain, then there would be no evidence of type. The vultological signals cognitive typology uses would have to be results of consistent patterns of brain activity, so there would have to be consistent neurophysiological indicators of type or else, vultology doesn’t exist. If these patterns are real then they necessarily have to be the result of measurable individual differences in people’s brains. There’s no other option. If two people have the same vultology then they must have the same neurology responsible for that vultology.

    The adaptation argument works on vultology too. You could say that if an Fe type was trained to smile like an Fi type then they wouldn’t smile like an Fe type, which would mean the signals are unreliable. It’s all physiological adaptation.

    I wasn’t defining type as physiological brain specialization, but rather as the inborn neural functionality one is born with. It was a combination of nature and nurture that led DJ Khaled and Neil DeGrasse Tyson down their respective paths. The actions people take and the decisions they make over a lifetime are influenced by internal and external factors. Additionally, how people process information is influenced by environmental and personal contributions. If cognitive typology is only trying to be a theory of information processing or perception then I understand why the activities a person engages in would be considered less important than how they understand things. However, at the same time, I think the way people understand things influences action to a profound degree, which makes it hard for me to see why there would be no correlation between cognition and behavior.

    Another to put this is just that the behavioral profiles don’t match the vultological profiles. I don’t see why there even are behavioral profiles if cognitive typology is also claiming to not be trying to make any predictions about behavior. I don’t think you ever actually addressed this aspect of my original comment, which may be why it’s coming up again. Why describe what different types are likely to do if what they do doesn’t have to agree with how they present vultologically?

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