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The Ecstatic Soul: A New Look at the INFJ Personality

Home 2023 › Forums › Type Specific › Beta › The Ecstatic Soul: A New Look at the INFJ Personality

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  • #31118
    Juan E. Sandoval
    Keymaster
    • Type: TiNe
    • Development: l--l
    • Attitude: Adaptive

    Link: https://www.amazon.com/Ecstatic-Soul-Look-INFJ-Personality-ebook/dp/B09GC7YYD5/

    Hi guys!

    This thread is a review of our member Ren's book, and also an opportunity to spark new discussions together, compare notes on observed phenomenon, and grow. At this point in time I'm about halfway through the book, but if I wait until the end, I'm afraid I will lose the clarity of some of my earlier thoughts, so I wanted to write my current thoughts on it now, while they are fresh.

    The book reads like the work of a serious academic mind. It's philosophical in nature while keeping to organic language and avoiding cumbersome jargon. It's precisely this sort of effort that we need more of in the Jungian community. It follows the travels of the NiFe/TiSe cognition through its various existential predicaments. And while I remain yet uncertain of Ren's type as either NiFe or FeNi, the matter is largely beside the point to the descriptions given, which appear to be extracted from various testimonies, and extracted out properly, from what I can tell.

    Terms

    One thing I appreciate right away is the similarity of terms Ren has to CT's. The concepts of introversion and extroversion are appropriately seen as cognitive, such that Fe can be mentally activated while a person is technically alone in their house, if what they are doing is cognitively contending with questions of social dynamics, either via thoughts or writings. This point, while quite obvious when articulated, is lost to many.

    Another point of harmony comes in the descriptions of Pe and Pi, with Pe 'gathering information from the external world' and Pi doing 'data-processing' and 'mapping'. This has parity with Pe as Explorer and Pi as Worldview/Map.

    The definitions of S and N given are: (S = static, stable, formally-represented, ordered.) (N = dynamic, free-flowing, patterned, open.) The essence behind these terms has parity with CT's definitions of S as discrete, literal and factual information, and N as associative, gradated and superpositional information. There's perhaps an opportunity for further clarity here, but already we're quite compatible.

    The definitions of F and T are actually those that I find most interesting to discuss, specifically as it relates to Fe and Te. What I would say is that Ren chooses to frame the matter by saying that Fe is not 'objective' - by which I understand his meaning; it is not about inanimate objects. There is some equivocation in the term objective, where it might mean focused on 'objects' of any sort, while also overlapping with the more materialist view where 'objective' is what CT calls abiotic; the world of things rather than beings. The resolution Ren comes to is to say Fe is focused on subjects and not objects, by which I understand him to mean living-agents.

    In CT, both living-agents and material artifacts are variants of "objects," as they are both phenomena externally present in the outer-world, which is what qualifies them as objects - notwithstanding their animate or inanimate nature. However, putting that matter aside, Ren and I ultimately converge on the definition of F and T, where the decisive point is: "the treatment of something as a 'subject' instead of an 'object'" / "The difference between an 'it' and a 'they.'" Here we see enough terminology agreement in I, E, S, N, F, T - to render discussion fruitful and exciting, which is by no means a given, or possible to do in all cases. And with that, we're capable and ready to start!

    Chapter 1: Existential Alienation

    What this first chapter says to me is that the conceptualization of an "outer world" is difficult for Ni, given how Se is in the polar position and invalidated. This has parity with what I call "accepting the ontological status" of a function. Both E+S attitudes lie in the polar, challenging the very notion of an ontological reality to 'externality' - leading to dangers of solipsism and alienation from reality.

    When I read this, it clicked in a new way why it might be that the Ni l--- types in the database so often either follow an explicitly panpsychic philosophy which loops everything back into their own mind, or otherwise see no differentiation between their own consciousness and that of others. It hadn't occurred to me that Ni's rejection of the ontological status of Se (and consequently both S+E), could yield a metaphysical world in which 'externality' is not a thing. The natural result of this view pushed to the limit is of course solipsism, and within solipsism, there is only one 'real' consciousness, and all others are facets of that one consciousness. Would this not make suspicions of telepathy a natural byproduct? A natural intuition to draw? After all, if there is but one mind, then all facets are linked. And would this not make extra-sensory-perception a natural outcome of the lack of differentiation between psychic-world and material-world?

    It seems to me that the various observed testimonies on those with Hypnotic Ni vultology (re: this video) are in harmony with this chapter's perspectives. Yet what is most fascinating to me is that I have been gathering these disparate datapoints independently, and yet not understanding completely how they connect. This seems like quite a psychologically harmonious explanation.

    But the explanation seems not to stop there. You also mentioned that the inability to validate the outer-world's ontology, simultaneously disallows for the differentiation of the individual from what is not-the-individual. In other words, in this solipsistic reality where mind and world are one, differentiation of self from world is impossible.

    The Ni-dominant is existentially alienated from his own subjecthood. It follows, by deduction, that the Ni-dominant is also alienated from his own selfhood, his own individuality, his own basic separateness from the world around him.

    Does this not sound precisely like what we hear in NiFe's Ekhart Tolle and Osho's insistence on the illusion of the ego? The intuition of these gentlemen and other Ni-leads, that ontological "separation" is a falsehood, including separation of oneself from the universe, could come about from this very same phenomenon. I really enjoyed this chapter, as it somehow succeeded in unifying so many separate points of the Ni-lead experience, and I thank you for that. I think it's simultaneously helps affirm the vultological methodology of CT, as it appears it can succeed in grouping together such minds that share on a phenomenological experience.

    I'm still processing the full implications of these ideas, but it goes without saying that there is a lot to think about. So I will continue from here to the next chapter.

    Chapter 2: The World Recovered

    In this chapter, Ren argues that the unconscious nature of Se, which invalidates the ontology of the outer-world (E+S), can be most accessibly combated through Fe, as an E function, but also by rationality (J) more generally, which allows for a rational understanding of the outside world to be 'accepted' by means of reason, even if it goes against a more deeply felt reality. However, even this is imperfect because the "validated world" of Fe is not the same material world that is validated by Te (abiotic). What results is a quasi-solution in which connection to the external still remains contingent on an ongoing and messy intersubjectivity between interlocutors.

    I must recommend taking a peek at this thread, as it is eerily similar to what you are saying here. It touches upon quotes by Will Herberg, Martin Buber and Vladimir Moss. These gentlemen use theology to explain what I think is essentially their own phenomenology - as I think often happens with humans. But the core idea is that the I-Thou relationship validates the individual's reality, by the very act of being intersubjectively perceived by either God or any other.

    ^ Inter-object-contingency for their mutual animate ontology. The creation of consensus reality.

    The way Fe validates the ontology of objects is by their relational correspondence to other subjectivities. This is very much an idea we see with Betas in the database, specifically those heavy in Fe. And so I also find this chapter quite correct in its premise and conclusions. The NiFe "recovers" some sense of the world through Fe, but what it recovers is an intersubjective reality, which is still not the same as Te's abiotic viewpoint of objects. So it still suffers from some problems relating to reality, because it creates curious implications such as "If reality is intersubjectively created, then if all subjects agreed on something being real, would that become real?" I actually want to bring in @unison (Beta) into this, as he said something in a video he made which is quite apt:

    But i actually think that this reality itself functions a little bit like a dream in the sense that if you're dreaming (have you ever had a lucid dream? yep) so in a lucid dream you can do whatever you want. Really it's your own mind right, so you can if you want to, make a pink elephant show up in front of you. You can do that. I don't think that there's a huge difference between this reality in a dream other than in this reality there's well there's close to eight billion human participants as well as you know countless other creatures of like animals and insects and so forth. So i think that the combination of all the participants is what essentially creates this reality.

    So an implication of that would, you know, be that if you know every being in unison agreed that there was going to be a pink elephant right there, then i think that there actually would be. That's never going to happen so you're never going to see it. And that's never going to occur, so it's a consensus reality, yeah that's a good word for it. That's why nothing really weird ever goes on because the odds of everyone expecting something weird to happen at the same time is basically zero.

    I have to take a pause here before proceeding, but that brings me fairly close to where I am in the book, although I am in chapter three right now.

    I will continue my review of this book as I read more of it, but it suffices to say that what I am reading, and what I have independently observed on vultological Beta types and their psychologies, is in quite a fair alignment. I feel confident we are observing the same phenomenon, and that an external phenomenon exists, as evidenced by our convergences on these topics, each being able to better inform the other.

    #31258
    Ren
    Participant
    • Type: FeNi
    • Development: llll
    • Attitude: Adaptive

    Hi Auburn! Thanks for creating a thread on my book. I'll react to bits and pieces while looking forward to the further observations you'll have about the remaining portions of the work.

    It hadn't occurred to me that Ni's rejection of the ontological status of Se (and consequently both S+E), could yield a metaphysical world in which 'externality' is not a thing. The natural result of this view pushed to the limit is of course solipsism, and within solipsism, there is only one 'real' consciousness, and all others are facets of that one consciousness. Would this not make suspicions of telepathy a natural byproduct? A natural intuition to draw? After all, if there is but one mind, then all facets are linked. And would this not make extra-sensory-perception a natural outcome of the lack of differentiation between psychic-world and material-world?

    Yes, I agree with this. The more I think about it, the more it seems to me that the category of the 'alienated INFJ' is isomorphic with the CT category of the NiFe in standard development (l---). I say 'isomorphic' and not 'synonymous', because the l--- category is a psycho-vultological one, whereas alienation, as deployed in the book, is a mode of existence, an existential 'condition'. But I think it wouldn't be a leap to say that an NiFe individual with l--- development is likely to experience himself as existentially alienated. Once again 'alienation' here is not meant as a pejorative but as a descriptive term. One of the major implications of the book, it seems to me, is that it recommends a distinct path of development from the path that would focus on the functions themselves. What it says, in essence, is: "Get out into the world and do things. Live. Functional development will happen along the way." Whereas to begin with a focus on self-development, from the alienated INFJ's perspective anyway, would be merely to reiterate the inflating of self at the expense of world, and so, unwittingly, to plunge even deeper into alienation.

    Ecstatic, as used in existential phenomenology, is a condition of being outside oneself, permanently projected beyond oneself as one experiences one's being; the best example being how we experience the temporal present. Heidegger describes the experience of the present as within an ecstatic temporality linking past-present-future in this permanent back-and-forth which is never absolutely centered. Concepts and abstractions, on the other hand, have a tendency towards stasis, essentialism, atemporality, eternality, etc. In many ways the point of the book is to suggest that existence is not a concept, and therefore that self-development shouldn't begin or end with concepts, but merely use them as signposts in one's going forward in the flow of life. This is also the implicit message of Jungian Existentialism: our concepts, theories, categories, classes, names, and so on (like 'cognitive functions', 'libido', 'stages of development' etc.) are extremely useful and even indispensable, but we experience our lives as always in excess of these concepts, and thus the best way out of alienation is to relate to categories as means to ends rather than ends in themselves.

    To put the point provocatively: if someone were to tell me "wow, your development is llll, that is fascinating", I would answer: "I don't understand what you mean. You haven't asked me what I've done about it, how I've experienced it, what it has meant for me, what it translates into in terms of my concrete everyday experience. llll development is just a category, and as such it has no particular value. What has value is what the category designates in concrete existence."

    Perhaps the above can throw a light on how Jungian Existentialism and CT are complementary. I see CT as dealing more with questions of truth, JE as dealing more with questions of value. Both are primordial, and I would perhaps go so far as to suggest that they are not complete without each other.

    I have much more to say on plenty of related topics, but I'll stop here for now!

    • This reply was modified 4 years, 4 months ago by Ren.
    • This reply was modified 4 years, 4 months ago by Ren.
    • This reply was modified 4 years, 4 months ago by Ren.
    • This reply was modified 4 years, 4 months ago by Ren.
    #31309
    Juan E. Sandoval
    Keymaster
    • Type: TiNe
    • Development: l--l
    • Attitude: Adaptive

    I've now read chapters 3, 4 and am on chapter 5 ("The path to monism"), and I wanted  to share my thoughts again while they're fresh:

    Chapter 3: Vision and Vocation

    Vision

    I like the separation made between 'vision' as an explicit and particular long-term-goal, versus the cognitive inclination to exist in a perpetual state of daily prescience/foreknowledge. I generally find the term vision ambiguous, so it's good to have a precise use of the term.

    Coming from CT's perspective, the root energetic Pi is associated with "anticipation and prediction" - which extends both to Si and Ni. In the case of Si, when a mapped territory is identified, "what comes next" is understood as a function of the understanding of the territory. One could say that what comes after spring ice melting is spring blossoms, and then hay fever, so better get that antihistamine at the pharmacy tomorrow. This gives Si users a concern and preparedness in life, because they can track what's likely to come next, based on literal knowledge and life experience.

    With Ni, some of that also applies since Pi is ~80% the same in both functions. But for Ni the prediction is more pattern-based in nature, and more neglectful of literality. For example, the results of an election may be predicted not based on a review of similar past elections, but by "taking the temperature" of the collective's psychology as it goes through stages of (for example) Denial->Anger->Bargaining->Grief->Acceptance. A certain Ni user may sense the zeitgeist is moving from Anger to Bargaining in its sociological stages, and so will pick X candidate rather than Y candidate due to what X candidate offers in the way of that stage's psychic fulfillment at the collective level.

    The "pattern" (the 5-stages of grief) is used as the tool for tracking the future, moreso than finding a historical analog to the present situation which can act as a factual reference. I'm using the 5-stages-of-grief here as an illustrative example, but these patterns may not be so formally defined, and can be privately constructed too. The main point is that "what comes next" relies on the next element in a (self-made) pattern, rather than literal precedent. And the world is approached with micro-anticipations of this sort at every turn, most being mundane in nature.

    Vocation

    I had a bit of trouble understanding the use of the word vocation (occupation?) for what was meant, but eventually got it, I think? It's the treatment of prescience as an ever-uncovering process, rather than a discrete clairvoyant prediction? I might have chosen a word like elucidation, which implies a continual process of ever-elucidating understandings, such that the vision itself is viewed with more lucidity as more people collaborate - even if the end looks a bit different from the beginning.

    In any case, what came to mind when reading this section was Carl Jung. In my mind, the visions Carl Jung had are still being uncovered and CT is part of that tradition. I once called CT the physical realization of that very same essential intuition, which follows very much this sentiment:

    The meaning that has been actualised was first a potential gestating inside his Ni. He is always the first link in the chain.

    The confirmation or falsification of a vision comes much later than its inception. And sometimes it's confirmed in whole, but most of the time it's confirmed in part. And sometimes it's not confirmed at all, but the flaws are laid bare at last. Which of those it is, is indeed something that can be existentially stressful to a high-Ni user. I found your "collaborative" approach a very healthy one, as it can allow validation of Ni's essential function in the psyche, while also not falling into the trap of believing itself infallible - as all functions are inclined to believe. If it sees "something", then that something can be affirmed in meaningfulness while not necessarily needing to be represented in the literal world in unmodified form. I enjoyed this chapter.

    Chapter 4: The Body Recovered

    With this chapter, two different ideas of the inferior function were presented. One in which the fourth function cannot, by definition, enter consciousness directly because the definition of the type is tautologically defined by this very inability. The other idea proposed an indirect integration of the function (Se), by means of world-recovery more generally via Ni+Fe+Ti, thus preserving the tautology of the 'INFJ'.

    From a CT perspective, I find myself in disagreement, and I see no necessary mechanism in place for Ni+Fe+Ti to bring Se into fruition. It seems a little farfetched, but I can understand why this might have been a tempting hypothesis or speculation, as you admitted it being.

    Contrary to Carl Jung's view (and this is where the final elucidation of the phenomenon can differ somewhat from the original vision), we do see CT types utilizing their polar function with competence and agency, in both activities and in mental appreciations of them. Why then was there such an insistent belief against this possibility?

    I think the trouble of writing a purely conceptual or psychological system is that you can run into circular pitfalls like this. The fear that the very definition of the type may vanish if X and Y traits are seen together, is understandable, but from a perspective of a biological definition of type, this is a non-problem. If the biology, and vultology, of the type remains the root anchor-point of the type, then the type is allowed to have within them contrary opinions: Ni and Se. It is only when the type is treated as little more than an abstract concept, suspended in a necessary antithetical symmetry to its opposite concept, that such co-existing viewpoints remain impossible.

    Nevertheless, I think retaining this tautological purity in type-description is something of a crutch that typology hasn't been able to wean itself out of, until a physical instantiation can act as a replacement anchor, and allow freedom of thought and behavior to reign true in all types. I found this part of the chapter peculiar, especially in relation to the synthetic perspective articulated in the following chapter. But I did enjoy the little section about the functionalist view.

    Functionalist view

    As I mentioned in DMs, this is essentially the same viewpoint CT takes, in its CTA.

    Spoiler

    [collapse]

    ^ It also starts with Information Gathering (Pe), and indeed it also ends with Je (procedural processing)

    The similarities between our articulations of the phenomenon are rather strong. Here for example:

    (P+) Information Gathering – presents the information from the outer world (via the senses) into working memory. Pe: Gathering - "have the task of gathering data in the outside world. Without them, it would be impossible for a person to access any kind of objective information."
    (P-) Temporal Contextualizing – works to connect the object episodically with other instances of it across time. Pi: Processing - The data is then processed by means of introverted perception (Ni, Si). This is the stage at which ‘raw’ information is refined into patterns.
    (J-) Definitional Processing – works to describe the boundaries of the object by differentiating objects from one another. Ji: Deliberating - checks how the patterns can be made to match with the person’s web of beliefs. This introduces an internal vetting process, whereby authentic patterns (Fi) or coherent ones (Ti) are retained, while everything else is discarded.
    (J+) Procedural Processing – works to understand the actions/verbs of the object, and how it moves causally in the world via positions/vectors. Je: Justifying - external vetting through extroverted judgement (Fe, Te). By the end of the process, the information has been either publicly redeemed as valid or rejected.

    ^ I actually think our views are more similar than what even this shows, at a glance, by how we treat the concepts. Perhaps without putting it in these terms, I think you've essentially started to devise an Energetics-first view of cognition (Pe-Pi-Je-Ji dynamics), the same as in CT. This allows for a lot of room for future discussion about the specifics. I'd love to have followup conversations with you on the little nuances of how we define the energetics similarly or differently, and why that might be. But I'll move on to the next chapter for now.

    Chapter 5: The Path to Monism

    I'm not done with this chapter, but it's quite an interesting one! It's especially interesting in light of your recent vultology report, which demonstrated four-function consciousness in you. This is in quite the agreement with what you said about Jung's take on the synthetic development. What I see in this book is essentially a personal guide for four-function integration. As you navigate from chapter to chapter, you explicate how it is that you've gone about reconciling ontological conflicts between the various Beta functions. (Although in CT you appear as FeNi llll, much of what you share in the book would still apply. And we can talk about your type more in another thread, as I'm eager to discuss.)

    But anyhow, your monistic viewpoint in this chapter is not only one which we might anticipate a fully-integrated individual to hold, but it's also at the very foundation of CT's philosophy; being a mind-matter theory. I see CT as being a radical embracing of the notion that mind and mater, mental and physical, are not separate. I found this particulate quote interesting:

    Most people would be tempted to say that whatever there is must be made of the same stuff. However, when they are asked to explain how e.g. mental states can be shown to be substantially the same as physical states, they run into an impasse (not me! :'D). For the purposes of our life in society, it is incredibly useful to assume that there is a duality of mind and body, matter and spirit, as it allows us to dodge seemingly insoluble metaphysical questions.

    [emphasis added]

    People do indeed run into an impasse, even though at some level they know their division/dualism must be false. I talked about this at some length in the first video of my lecture series. Carl Jung acknowledge this illusion of separateness, but his position was to begrudgingly resign himself to focus on the phenomenological (metaphysical) element of things, not the physical, and he mostly retained the separation between the two aspects by his silence. Some people think Jung didn't really see the two as connected, because of this, but I just think he was overwhelmed by the problem and couldn't solve the divide. It's interesting to note that Carl Jung appears as NiFe ll-- in vultology, meaning recovery of Se did not happen for him.

    As for Western culture; yes indeed. I am still baffled sometimes by how I'm met with individuals who are so skeptical of mind-body psychology, as if it's some heretical teaching. And they resist/reject it in a deeply personal way; a way that is emotional and which goes beyond a simple opinion. And I think the reason for this anxiety is because it is the harder view to hold, and it violate the more cognitively easy but dualistic view you describe.

    If you allow the two domains to remain separate, you artificially allow your metaphysical self to have freedom from the physical. You excuse yourself from the criticism that might come from your objective appearance contradicting your self-perception. And you can justify a negation of vultology because the primacy of mind has "nothing to do with" physicality; the spirit and matter are separate. Therefore, the practice of vultology is itself metaphysically abominable to those whose cognitive balance has been formed around dualism.

    This is also why I see the practice of vultology as world-redeeming, in the sense that it aims to bridge the metaphysical and physical, to honor that holism by not running away from the problem, but tackling it head-on. I don't think we can really solve the problem of human consciousness until and unless we understand what relationship our embodiment has to our minds, since from an evolutionary perspective it seems mind and body co-evolved and always co-exist.

    Edit: also:

    If my argument is correct so far, there must be an internal connection between a person’s worldview and their psychical makeup. (and their vultological makeup!) In the language of this book, a person’s worldview projects her first-person (existential) experience into a rational, representational, unified concept of world. In that way, she avoids cognitive dissonance.

    [emphasis added]

    The connection between function-integration and worldview is sensible to me, in general. But the 3-4-function-consciousness discord channel may prove a better case-study for how correct this is. But it's amazing to me that we also see vultological balance go hand-in-hand with this cognitive synthesis. It further supports the unification of mind and body, and the intimate tie.

    When CT first started to discover that people could be integrated in multiple functions, and that this integration had a vultological analog that was consistent, it was a game-changer. It allows us to (roughly) trace the level of psychological integration a person has, based on their outward comportment, which is wild. I'm sure the correlation isn't 100%, but I would wager the percentage of llll individuals with a unified worldview/metaphysics will be much higher than the population average, if we ran a study on it.

    (I'll stop here as I've already gone on way longer than I expected!)

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